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Fear that such a rule may have the effect of destroying 
the finality of judgments and injuriously affecting rights 
of innocent third persons which may intervene between the 
erroneous decision and the recall of the remittitur, may be 
obviated by the recognition of the validity of any rights 
of innocent third parties which have intervened. Under 
this rule a court would not be faced with the unhappy di-
lemma of seeing justice thwarted because of its impotency 
to correct an error for which it alone is responsible. 
I would permit the decision of the District Court of Ap-
peal recalling the remittitur in this case to stand, to the 
end that it may reconsider and decide the case anew on 
its own merits. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 17, 
1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[Sac. No. 6232. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1952.] 
W. F. CONNER et al., Respondents, v. SOUTHERN P A-
CIFIC COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Appellants. 
[1] Railroads-Injuries From Operation-Questions of Law and 
Fact.-In action for wrongful death arising out of collision of 
train with a towed automobile which the deceased was steering, 
questions whether the railroad was negligent in the circum-
stances, whether any such negligence was a proximate cause 
of the accident, and whether the deceased was guilty of negli-
gence which proximately contributed to cause the accident, 
were properly left to the jury. 
[2] Automobiles- Instructions-Contributory Negligence-Oper-
ator of Towed Vehicle.-In action for wrongful death of the 
operator of a towed automobile, the court is not bound to 
give an instruction that one guiding a towed vehicle has less 
control over its progress than does the driver of the towing 
vehicle, where no such instruction was requested; moreover, 
such fact is obvious without an instruction declaring it. 
[3] Id.- Instructions- Contributory Negligence- Operator of 
Towed Vehicle.-In action for the wrongful death of the oper-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Railroads, § 121(1); [2, 3] Automo-
blies, § 343-1; [4] Railroads, § 122(9); [5, 6] New Trial, § 124; 
[7] Railroads, §86(2); [8] Automobiles, § 139-1. 
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ator of a towed vehicle, it is proper to instruct the jury that 
they must determine whether deceased exercised the care and 
vigilance for his own safety which the circumstances required; 
that negligence is always a relative question, relative to the 
circumstances of the time, of the place, and of the person or 
persons; and that the person in charge of the towed vehicle 
is bound to exercise reasonable care for his own safety in 
steering or operating it. 
[4] Railroads-Injuries From Operation-Instructions.-In action 
for wrongful death arising out of collision of train with a 
towed automobile which the deceased was steering, instruc-
tions that the deceased should have exercised reasonable care 
in the circumstances in which he was, and that it was for the 
jury to decide whether he could and should have done anything 
more than let himself be pulled slowly into the path of the 
approaching train, are not erroneous in law or misleading 
in fact. 
[5] New Trial-Errors Relating to Instructions-Discretion-Re-
view.-Whether instructions which are actually erroneous are 
cured by other correct instructions, or are prejudicial is a 
question for the discretion of the trial court; but where the 
instructions are correct, there is no basis for the exercise of 
discretion, and no legal ground in that respect on which a new 
trial may be granted. 
[6] !d.-Errors Relating to Instructions-Discretion-Review.-
An inquiry as to whether instructions are erroneous presents 
purely a question of law, and if it appears on appeal that a 
trial court in granting a new trial based its order exclusively 
on an erroneous concept of legal principles applicable to the 
cause, its order will be reversed. 
[7] Railroads-Injuries From Operation-Contributory Negligence 
-Care at Crossings.-One sitting behind a steering wheel of 
a towed automobile which was struck by a train at a railroad 
crossing was not "utterly helpless" as a matter of law to 
alter the course of the towing and towed vehicles where there 
is evidence that his car was equipped with steering gear, brakes 
and horn, and that before the vehicles went on the tracks 
they were going so slowly and up such a grade that he, by ap-
plying his brakes, could have stopped both of them in safety. 
[8] Automobiles-Contributory Negligence-Operator of Towed 
Vehicle.-The limited ability of one at the wheel of a towed 
vehicle to control its travel does not justify his depending 
entirely, as might a mere passenger, on the vigilance of the 
driver of the towing car; he must exercise ordinary care in 
watching for traffic, railway trains, etc., in the control of his 
[5] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, §92; Am.Jur., New Trial, §117; 
__________ ....... 
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own car to a reasonable extent, in sounding his horn to warn 
the driver of the towing vehicle if such action appears reason-
ably necessary, and, in case of slow speed conditions, in leaving 
the towed car if reasonably necessary . 
.APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tehama 
County granting a new trial. .Arthur Coats, Judge.* Re-
versed . 
.Action for damages for wrongful death. Order granting 
plaintiffs a new trial, reversed. 
Glenn D. Newton for .Appellants . 
.Alfred E. Frazier and Duard F. Geis for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Defendants appeal from an order grant-
ing plaintiffs' motion for new trial in an action for wrong-
ful death. The motion was granted for asserted error in 
instructions. We have concluded that the jury were cor-
rectly instructed. It necessarily follows that the trial court's 
order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial 
cannot be sustained. 
Bill Conner, plaintiffs' son, was killed when defendants' 
train struck an automobile which was being steered by Con-
ner while in tow of a pickup truck driven by Richard Ben-
son. Benson drove upgrade at a speed of about five miles 
an hour across defendants' tracks and did not see the train 
until it was too late for him to accelerate and pull Conner's 
car off the tracks. Visibility was good and both drivers 
were familiar with the crossing. There is evidence from 
which the jury could, and its verdict implies that it did, 
:find that, had Conner kept a lookout for his own safety, 
he would have seen the train1 and could have signaled to 
Benson and thereby caused the latter to avoid the accident 
or he could have escaped from the towed car before it was 
struck; also, the evidence would support a finding that Con-
ner by seasonably applying his brakes after he was in a 
position to see the oncoming train could have stopped both 
vehicles before even the towing car went upon the crossing. 
*Assigned by Chainnan of Judicial Council. 
1The track to the. north, from which direction the train approached, 
was straight and the view unobstructed for at least a mile from the 
point, approximately 60 feet from the tracks, where Benson slowed to 
a speed of about five miles per hour preparatory to crossing the tracks. 
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The trial court instructed the jury that Benson was guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law. 2 [1] The questions whether 
the railroad was negligent in the circumstances, whether any 
such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, and 
whether Conner (the deceased) was guilty of negligence 
which proximately contributed to cause the accident, were 
left to the jury. rrhis (at least as against plaintiff) was proper, 
and the instructions upon which such issues were submitted 
were not erroneous. 
The jury were told that ''A traveler approaching a rail" 
way crossing with the intent of crossing thereover on a 
public highway is required, if he does not stop, to ap-
proach the tracks with his vehicle under control so as not 
to render ineffective other precautions required of him, such 
as looking and listening for the approach of a train, and 
so that he may be able to stop or turn aside while still 
in a position of safety upon ascertaining that a train is ap-
proaching which might endanger his passage over said track"; 
and that he must yield the right of way to an approaching 
train. 
[2] The principal argument of the plaintiffs is to the 
effect that no instruction expressly directed the attention 
of the jury to the fact-or instructed them that as a mat-
ter of law it is a fact-that one guiding a towed vehicle has 
less control over its progress than does the driver of the 
to·wing vehicle. Whether, under the circumstances here, 
such an instruction on that proposition of fact would have 
been proper is beside the point; no such instruction was re-
quested and the · court was not bound to so instruct of its 
own motion. Moreover, the fact is obvious without an in-
struction declaring it. [3] As to the applicable law the 
jury were properly informed that they must determine whether 
deceased ''exercised the care and vigilance for his own safety 
which the circumstances required''; that negligence is '' al-
ways a relative question-relative to the circumstances of the 
time, of the place, and of the person or persons''; that ''The 
person in charge of the towed vehicle is bound to exercise 
reasonable care for his own safety in steering or operating 
it. Whether proper care has been exercised is a matter 
to be determined according to the facts of the particular 
2Because of our conclusion that there is no error adverse to plain-
tiffs in the instructions we do not need to consider whether upon un-
disputed evidence decedent, like Benson, was as a matter of law guilty 
of negligence which proximately contributed to his death. 
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case.'' The above quoted instructions correctly and ade-
quately informed the jury as to the duty of care of one 
in the position of deceased. The record discloses no basis 
for a determination that the jury did not follow such in-
structions in arriving at their verdict. 
[ 4] The court appears to have granted the new trial 
because it decided that the jury were misled by its instruc-
tions, which, it concluded, did not sufficiently emphasize the 
factual proposition that Conner had less opportunity to 
control the vehicles than did Benson. But the instructions 
are not erroneous in law or misleading in fact. They cor-
rectly informed the jury that Conner should have exercised 
reasonable care in the circumstances in which he was, and 
left it to the jury to decide whether he could and should 
have done anything more than let himself be pulled slowly 
into the path of the approaching train. [5] Whether in-
structions which are actually erroneous are cured by other, 
correct instructions or are prejudicial is a question for the 
discretion of the trial court (Fennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co. (1938), 10 Cal.2d 538, 544 [76 P.2d 104]) but where, 
as here, the instructions are correct, there is no basis for 
the exercise of discretion, and no legal ground, in that re-
spect, on which a new trial may be granted (Parker v. Womack 
(1951), 37 Cal.2d 116, 123 [230 P.2d 823]). [6] The in-
quiry as to whether instructions are erroneous presents purely 
a question of law (Dodds v. Gifford (1932), 127 Cal.App. 
629, 634 [16 P.2d 279]; Markham v. Hancock Oil Go. (1934), 
2 Cal.App.2d 392, 395 [37 P.2d 1087]) and if it appears on 
appeal that a trial court in granting a new trial based its 
order exclusively upon an erroneous concept of legal prin-
ciples applicable to the cause, its order will be reversed 
(Estate of Baird (1926), 198 Cal. 490, 507 [246 P. 324]). 
Plaintiffs rely on the statement, quoted with approval 
from 3 Cal.Jur. 854, in Marchetti v. Southern Pac. Co. (1928), 
204 Cal. 679, 683 [269 P. 529], that "a passenger in a ma-
chine operated by another cannot be said as a matter of 
law to have been negligent in not calling the chauffeur's 
attention to the danger of a collision.'' The statement has 
no application here. Conner was not a passenger and the 
question of his contributory negligence was one of fact. 
[7] In Pairman v. Mars (1942), 55 Cal.App.2d 216, 219-
220 [130 P.2d 448], it was said that "One sitting behind a 
steering wheel of a towed car is utterly helpless so far as 
directing the course or conduct of such car." This state-
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ment, in its application to the facts of this case, obviously 
is incorrect. The record here shows that Conner's car was 
equipped with steering gear, brakes and horn. There is 
evidence that before the towing and towed vehicles went 
upon the tracks they were going so slowly and up such a 
grade that Conner, by apply}ng his brakes, could have 
stopped both of them in safety.3 Furthermore, he was not 
as a matter of law "utterly helpless" to alter the course 
of the vehicles. (See Farrar v. Whipple (1924), 65 Cal.App. 
123, 126 [223 P. 80], affirming judgment against one whose 
negligent steering of a towed vehicle resulted in injury to 
others.) [8] The limited ability of one at the wheel of 
a towed vehicle to control its travel would not justify his 
depending entirely, as might (under some circumstances) 
a mere passenger, on the vigilance of the driver of the 
towing car. Certainly he would have the duty of exercis-
ing ordinary care in watching for traffic, railway trains, etc., 
in the control of his own car to a reasonable extent, in sound-
ing his horn to warn the driver of the towing vehicle if such 
action appeared reasonably necessary, and, under the slow 
speed conditions shown here, in leaving the towed car if 
reasonably necessary. 
Since the jury, correctly instructed, impliedly found upon 
sufficient evidence that Conner failed to exercise the reason-
able care required of one in his position and that his negli-
gence proximately contributed to cause his death, the granting 
of a new trial upon the ground designated was error. 
For the reasons above stated, the order is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
In a whole series of instructions the jury was told that 
the pilot of a car being towed must do all that an operator 
of a car must do and more to escape the charge of contrib-
utory negligence when he is being towed across a grade 
""THE CouRT [to witness Benson] : ... The question, of course, is 
you towing his car and you not putting your brakes on, and he putting 
it on, I presume, what distance could he have stopped his car, which 
also means stopping yours, too~ A. I guess he could have stopped 
in six or seven feet. 
"MR. NEWTON [defendants' counsel]: And he didn't give you any 
signal to stop as you were going up the grade, did he~ A. No. . .. 
'' Q. There is a gradual rise as you leave the highway to approach 
the railroad tracks~ A. About a four foot rise from the highway.'' 
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railroad crossing. The jury was told that more care was 
required than of the operator of the towing car, because, 
as will later be shown, he was expected to exercise the highest 
degree of care. Nevertheless the majority holds that the 
instructions were not erroneous and therefore the trial court 
was wrong in granting a new trial after verdict for defend-
ant railroad company. It must be remembered that in this 
case there are three persons involved. The railroad em-
ployees operating the train, Benson, who was driving the 
car which was doing the towing, and the deceased, who was 
in the towed car. Benson is not a party defendant or plain-
tiff and any negligence of his is not imputed to the deceased. 
Hence, the only instructions pertinent would be those deal-
ing with the situation as between the railroad crew and the 
deceased, the occupant of the towed car. 
The trial court gave the following instruction (quoted in 
the majority opinion) : "A traveler approaching a railway 
crossing with the intent of crossing thereover on a public 
highway is required, if he does not stop, to approach the 
tracks with his vehicle under control so as not to render 
ineffective other precautions required of him, such as look-
ing and listening for the approach of a train, and so that 
he may be able to stop or turn aside while still in a position 
of safety upon ascertaining that a train is approaching 
which might endanger his passage over said track." (Italics 
added.) (Instruction No. 24.) In addition, the jury was 
advised: ''The railway train has the right of way and in 
their operation of a train toward and over a crossing, the 
trainmen have the right to assume that every person will 
approach the crossing exercising ordinary care to avoid col-
lision, and will look and listen for an approaching train 
and stop, if necessary, before he or she crosses to let the 
train go by." (Instruction No. 17.) "It is the rule in 
respect of the right-of-way at a railroad crossing that a 
vehicle or person approaching a steam railroad crossing, 
with the intention of going over the tracks, is under the 
duty to yield the right-of-way at that crossing to any rail-
road train which may be approaching the crossing." (Italics 
added.) (Instruction No. 18.) "You are instructed that 
in approaching a railroad crossing, a continuous duty is 
imposed upon the driver of an automobile to maintain a 
lookout in the directions from which danger is anticipated." 
(Instruction No. 19.) "The tracks of a railroad, such as 
that involved in this case, are in themselves a warning of 
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danger. The view of the tracks and intersection in this 
case was unobstructed and under these conditions before 
one drives a vehicle into the space which would be occupied 
by a train if it were to pass over such tracks, it is his duty 
to use every reasonable opportunity to look and listen for 
the approach of train, engine or car on the tracks. What 
is included in the term 'every reasonable opportunity' de-
pends on all the surrounding circumstances, as they would 
be met and viewed by a person of ordinary prudence, if he 
occupied the same position as the one whose conduct is in 
question." (Instruction No. 23.) Summarized, those in-
structions informed the jury that plaintiff was in exactly 
the same position as the driver of a car, in full control 
thereof, approaching a railroad crossing and must do all the 
things such a person could do; that the train crew may as-
sume he will look, listen, and if necessary stop ; that he must 
yield the right of way to the train, and maintain a continuous 
lookout; that by implication he must stop, approach the 
crossing with the vehicle under control and be able to stop 
or turn aside. 
The jury was told in effect that the mere fact alone that 
the car is being towed constitutes contributory negligence, 
because the things the deceased was required to do could 
be done only by someone who was operating the towing car. 
It should be obvious that when a person is in control of 
a car being towed he is practically helpless. He cannot stop 
or swerve and thus cannot yield the right of way. To 
expect him to look and listen is also unreasonable. All 
his attention must be focused on the towing operation if 
he is to avoid running into the towing car, fouling the tow 
line, or having his car upset. Certainly, he is in a more 
helpless position than a passenger in a car. While a pas-
senger may not have a brake at his foot or a steering wheel 
in his hand, he can communicate with the driver and in-
form him of approaching danger. In the instant case to 
require the deceased to put on the brake (assuming that 
would be safe) would demand making the choice between 
his life and that of the driver of the towing car, for other-
wise he would stop the towing car in the path of the train. 
If he attempted to brake his car the result might well be 
to stall the towing car. It is asserted that deceased could 
have blown his horn, but there is no showing that the horn 
was operating. In any event the driver of the towing car 
would not have known of the reason for blowing the horn. 
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For the foregoing reasons, judges taking a common sense 
view with regard to the operation of a towed car have com-
mented: ''One sitting behind a steering wheel of a towed 
car is utterly helpless so far as directing the course or con-
duct of such car. He is not the driver either in the statu-
tory sense or in any sense. No amount of turning of the 
steering wheel by him will alter its course." (Fairman v. 
11iot·s, 55 CaLApp.2d 216, 219-220 [130 P.2d 448].) 
The effect of the foregoing clearly erroneous instructions 
was magnified by another faulty instruction which in effect 
told the jury that even slight negligence on decedent's part 
would bar recovery; that is to say it was advised that he 
was required to use extraordinary care. The instruction 
reads : ''Contributory negligence is such an act or omission 
of a person killed or injured, amounting to want of ordinary 
care in the circumstances of the case, as concurring or co-
operation with a negligent act of a defendant, was a proxi-
mate cause of the death complained of. If, in this case, 
there was any conduct on the part of the person who was 
killed, amounting to negligence, no matter how slight, and 
if such negligence in any degree proximately contributed 
to the injury, no recovery can be had, and it will be your 
duty to return a verdict in favor of the defendants." (Italics 
added.) (Instruction No. 7.) It is settled that such an 
instruction is faulty because it tells the jury that only slight 
contributory negligence will bar recovery when it is the de-
gree of contribution that may be slight. It is error to in-
struct the jury that contributory negligence, no matter how 
slight, will bar recovery by plaintiff,· because it is in effect 
saying that contributory negligence is not ordinary negli-
gence, which is the doing of. something or the failure to 
do something which a reasonably prudent person would or 
would not have done under like circumstances. (Clark v. 
State of California, 99 Cal.App.2d 616 [222 P.2d 300] ; Strong 
v. Sacramento & P. R. R. Co., 61 Cal. 326; Polk v. City of 
Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 519 [159 P.2d 931]; Robinson v. West-
ern Pac. R. R. Co., 48 Cal. 409; Rush v. Lagomarsino, 196 
Cal. 308 [237 P. 1066] ; Morgan v. Los Angeles R. & G. Corp., 
105 Cal.App. 224 [287 P. 152] .) In Clark v. State of Cal-
ifornia, supra, the court said: "But appellant more justly 
complains of a group of instructions given by the court at 
defendants' request which as to the point now under con-
sideration may be summarized as follows: The court told 
38 C.2d-21 
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the jury that if the decedent was guilty of contributory 
negligence, no matter how slight, which proximately con-
tributed to the accident their verdict must be for the de-
fendants. Again the court said that in determining whether 
or not decedent was guilty of contributory negligence 'if you 
believe from the evidence that she was guilty of the slightest 
degree of negligence . . . and that such negligence proxi-
mately contributed to the accident and her death' the ver-
dict must be for the defendants. As said by the Supreme 
Court of California in Strong v. Sacramento & P. R. R. Co., 
61 Cal. 326, 328: 'The rule is, not that any degree of neg-
ligence, however slight, which directly concurs in producing 
the injury will prevent a recovery; but, if the negligence 
of the plaintiff, amounting to the absence of ordinary care, 
shall contribute proximately, in any degree, to the injury, 
the plaintiff shall not recover.' ... 
''While the lawyer and also the layman recognize that 
there are differing degrees of negligence, here ordinary neg-
ligence was the only degree of negligence involved, and to 
permit the jury to continue in their mistaken belief that 
they were concerned with the degree of negligence as dis-
tinguished from the degree of proximate contribution of 
that negligence to the happening of the accident and the 
infliction of the injury, was detrimental to plaintiff's interests, 
to say the least.'' 
It is conceded by the majority that where instructions 
are erroneous the question of prejudice and whether bad 
instructions are cured by others is for the discretion of the 
trial court on motion for a new trial. (Fennessey v. Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co., 10 Cal.2d 538 [76 P.2d 104] ; Mathers v. 
Cotmty of Riverside, 22 Cal.2d 781 [141 P.2d 419] ; Brignoli 
v. Seaboard Transp. Co., 29 Cal.2d 782 [178 P.2d 445].) 
That the jury was misled in the instant case is clear. I 
would, therefore, affirm the order granting a new trial. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April17, 
1952. Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
